Far from the Maddening Crowd

Far from the Maddening Crowd

It can pull you in.

Spit you out.

Build you up.

Shoot you down.

Drown you out.

Test your mind.

Mess you around.

A feeding ground for the opportunistic.

A landscape to explore for the futuristic.

For peace to come and settle the chatter,

To keep it real, for another matter.

The brightest of them constellate.  Abound.

Far from the maddening, maddening crowd.

S. Camplin



A grey day

A grey day

The grey has descended.

The grey, the grey.

The grey.

The light is fading,

Fading.

Shades of grey.

Fade to grey.

Be that as it may,

The light you shone,

Never gone.

Never gone.

S. Camplin

Kind Eyes.

Kind Eyes

The kindliest eyes,

Are the kind of eyes,

That I most want to see.

The kind that stream emotion.

Joy and sorrow too.

Shallow pools of brown and blue.

Be they wells of wisdom too.

The kindest eyes,

Are the greatest eyes,

To see you.  Honestly.

S. Camplin

Occupy me

Occupy me

Occupied my soul.

Occupied my time.

Occupied my mind.

Corporate occupations,

Bankrupt banking now.

Let us occupy our selves.

Not just for the grab.

Of my body.

Of my land.

Occupy me.

Occupy yourself.

Occupy and be.

Sweet nothing...

Sweet nothing...

Sweet scintillating stimulation.

You've stroked my soul so softly.

With suggestive speculations

Of something more solid.

I hope so...

S. Camplin

Irish Mist

Irish Mist

I was somewhat pissed

Amongst the Irish mist.

The clear bluest sea.

The brightest green fields.

It was lovely to see

The rolling clouds.

And it's better now,

That you're not around.

Tho' the tears did flow,

Upon the cliffs, and below.

My heart sang out,

Without any doubt.

Some healing was done,

Whilst the sun shone.

And a few fears flew away,

In a flock.

S. Camplin

You're no good for me...

You're No Good For Me

You're no good for me.

You're no good for me.

I keep telling you.

You're no good for me.

But you keep coming round,
I  keep you coming round.
Coz I love you.

But you're no good for me. 
You're no good for me.

You come around straight out of town.

'Cause u need me.

I think you love me too.

Why'd I feel so Blue.

Why'd I feel so Blue.

What am I to do?

'Cause I love you.

But you're no good for me.

You're no good for me.

You're no good for me.

(Song lyrics) S. Camplin

Is the unity of identity and difference proposed by Hegel detrimental to women?

Hegel, in his published work 'Phenomenology of Spirit' (1807), put forward philosophical ideas that have sparked discussion amongst feminists. Namely, and for the purposes of this discussion, that identity is constituted in relation to what is different and 'other'; and that a unity of sexual difference is realised in ethical life.  Hegel claims that the most fundamental over-riding desire of each human is to receive recognition from another human that one is self-conscious and therefore free. That one cannot ever truly recognise one's own freedom without recognising that same freedom within others.  Therefore, what we truly desire is 'mutual recognition'.  Human progress then, for Hegel, is characterised by the overcoming of differences.  That is, the subject strives to make what is different a reflection of its own identity.  However, Diprose in her work entitled 'Ethics, embodiment and sexual difference' (1994), examines the conditions necessary for the social unity he proposes, and reveals that this unity of identity and difference is impossible; and that the extent to which Hegel insists on this is done to the detriment of women. 

Diprose contends that one needs to examine how identity and difference are created in and through the other, and how this may be to the detriment of women.  Conversely, Irigaray (1994) believes that one should concentrate on how social attitudes and norms form the difference between men and women.  Hegel claims that in order to progress towards the unity of identity and difference, we need to dissolve sexual difference.  Butler (1994) explains that a person's identity is split into two, that it is divided between what it is, 'itself', and what it is not.  According to Butler, whilst a person's identity is constituted by social discourse, it is not determined by discourse.  Thus providing opportunities for women to achieve unity.  However, Benhabib (1987) argues that this is incomprehensible, and does not provide sufficient scope for representation and change.  Indeed, Diprose (1994) contends that difference is: "the locus of agency and the possibility of social change.  From it can emerge open-ended possibilities".  To try and provide these conditions for both men and women, one needs to examine the social structures that hold the mechanisms that suppress and exclude women, in place.

An important mechanism that continues to suppress women, one that Diprose (1994) identifies, and one which Hegel originally drew our attention to, is the problem of the social constitution of embodiment. Our bodies are our first point of contact with others, this body with its actions, habits, and the like is the first 'sign' of the self.  However, Hegel believes that women should be confined to the private and domestic sphere as they are the natural carers and nurturers, primarily concerned with the needs of the body.  As such, Hegel is all in favour of a 'division of labour', a social structure that is detrimental to women.  Young (1987) highlights the dichotomy that exists between reason and desire, that has become manifested in the social structures within which we live and work.  That is, the public and private spheres. 

Young (1987) recognises that it is Hegel who developed the idea of the public domain, or the state, as representing moral reason, as well as universality.  Universality being the idea that the state represents and expresses the will of the people, and the interests of the whole society.  Hegel even goes so far as to say that the state expresses the will and rational spirit of humanity, and that humanity strives towards the situation where individual self-consciousness becomes represented in social reality.  Hegel uses the notion of spirit to try and unite identity and difference: "...that is, where spirit is objectified such that the 'I' is 'We' and the 'We' is 'I'".  Benhabib (1992) suggests that one should preserve the differences between men and women, in order to protect against the onslaught of universalism, that Hegel regards as the ideal.  Benhabib cites the work of Carol Gilligan who argues that: "a universalist moral theory must also heed the voice of the 'excluded others'".

Diprose (1994) examines the process which institutionalises the consciousness of a state's population, the mechanisms that are held in place which purport to express the consciousness of the community.  According to Hegel, language and its meaning is always engaged in the universal, and is always embodied in a sign in such a way that the material signifier, that is actions or body language, is transformed so as to represent a meaning other than itself.  Therefore the spirit of the individual is transformed into a signifier of community ideals, without the possibility of being reduced to those ideals.

However, Diprose (1994) contends that Hegel's theory is incoherent.  He proposes that to overcome identity and difference, we must reduce an individual's spirit into a sign of rational consciousness, that is language and actions.  As Diprose points out: "Hegel claims that this distinction between the self-centred subject (who is a moment of soul or community) and its particular bodily self arises spontaneously from 'the contradiction of being an individual, a singular, and yet being at the same time immediately identical with the universal'".  He places great emphasis on the body, which through the formation of habits, comes to represent mind, will and thought, and is constituted as a sign of community life.

Hegel seems to ignore that for him, the individual's spirit is constructed and maintained by the distinction between mind and body, and the distinction btween the inside and the outside.  To try and overcome this difference, the subject through it's desire, which in turn becomes manifest as language and action, continues to seek it's identity in another.  And as Butler (1994) puts it, the satisfaction of desire is the transfoming of difference into identity. 

Diprose (1994) exposes the crux of Hegel's theory of the unity of identity and difference, and the social structures that maintain them to the detriment of women, in that: "The body must disappear as an essential element of one's ethos if the self is to succeed in projecting and reclaiming a representation of itself as independent and unviersal.  The body must be negated because it hinders the establishment of equivalences which can be mutually exchanged through recognition".  In other words, the locus of agency and change, and differences in ethos involve the different experiences one has lived, which are inextricably linked to our body.  Therefore, Hegel's ethical proposals are detrimental to women, as he identifies the body too heavily with ethos.  This ultimately leads him to advocate a division of labour.  Indeed, his ethics of universality stops short of successfully unifying the identity and difference of women, and in doing so it is not capable of mutually recognising the freedom of women.  In contrast, I would advocate the recognition of difference, and the equal application of the state's rules to that difference.  A view which is beautifully summed up by Anne Shawstock Sassoon (1991): 

    "In a sense what we have in common is our separateness, our uniqueness, the fact that we are different, our sense of being alone...making concrete the abstract concept of the individual helps us to recognise something else: viewed from one facet or another of our identity or our subjectivity, we each belong to a partial group, we are each an 'other', whatever our race, gender or nationality".

References incomplete :)

Abusing Foucault

Since Foucault published 'The History of Sexuality - Vol 1' in 1976, his ideas on the genealogy of sexuality and the implicit critique of feminist theories in his writing have stimulated a vibrant and often divisive debate amongst feminists.  As Braidotti (1991) highlighted, his ideas converge with feminism in four main areas: (1) bio-power; (2) the emphasis on the specific and local mode of operation of power; (3) the crucial role of discourse in the production of both knowledge and power and (4) the critique of humanism.

I wish to concentrate on the two main areas of convergence: bio-power, which is power over the body or embodied subject; and the role of discourse in producing and maintaining knowledge and power.  I will then briefly relate these to a feminist understanding of rape, used as an example of male domination in practice.

Bio-power, Bailey (1993) has argued, is particularly significant in the everyday lives of women: "Women's very bodies are tailored, by women, to conform to social ideas which are historically specific...an expression of power-knowledge relations" (1993: 104). Indeed, Foucault identifies the way discourses about sex signify who we are, and sees discourses on sexuality, as one of the most powerful means of controlling the embodied subject.  He writes: "It is a type of power which is constantly exercised by means of surveillance rather than in a discontinuous manner by means of a system of levies" (Foucault, in Ramazanoglou, 1993: 110).  That is, it is so ingrained and pervasive that we are all complicit in instituting and realising sexual discourses.  They have become the norm.

In terms of how Foucault's ideas challenge feminist theories, Braidotti explains how he: "...shows the illusory nature of theories of 'liberation' insofar as they seem to imply the existence of an authentic or real sexuality that would somehow be uncontaminated or 'outside' the ruling codes of our culture" (1991: 89).  Foucault guards against 'totalising discourses' and by implication criticises theories such as those of feminists which regard patriarchy as a monolithic power structure, as this is seen as being too limited in scope.  Bell (1993) argues that feminist perspectives are largely reactive to masculinist ones, and as such an eternal, circular argument ensues.

One can also argue that feminists have yet to develop a 'feminist theory of power', one that would put forward a definition of power.  Instead feminists have concentrated their efforts on exposing unequal power relations and on suggesting alternative strategies for emancipation.  As Ramazanoglu and Holland (1993) point out: "feminism has given relatively little attention to women's efforts to support and enable men's power over them" (1993: 247).

However, Foucault's model of power did not demonstrate much interest in how this discursive-knowledge production affected the female embodied subject.  Foucault advocates a negotiation of our lives, bodies and pleasures 'within' power, and without the category 'sex'.  By this he means that a process of desexualisation needs to be engaged with in the course of our interactions, so as to subvert the dominant discourses.  This, it can be argued, seems at best rather vague and abstract in the context of women's struggles, and at worst does not allow for how sex-specific abuse may affect those who experience it. 

Furthermore, Bailey (1993) adds, our understanding of bodies is totally dependent on our 'knowledge' of them, she asks whether we can ever have access to bodies outside of this discourse.  She writes: "whether or not these bodily elements pre-exist...there is no way to talk about it, think about it, write about it, know it - because there is no recourse to language 'outside' of this" (1993: 108).  However, one can argue that Bailey's rather Foucauldian viewpoint is dependent on traditional, masculinist ways of conceptualising women's experience.  Indeed, Irigaray (1985) encourages women to return to their own bodies and its desires, as this is not a biological construct, but rather comprises feelings that characterise its own subjectivity.

Braidotti (1991) illuminates Foucault's tactic, in that he wants to isolate ways in which the embodied subject oppresses themselves in their interactions with others, he is effectively advocating a transformation of the 'self'.  Foucault (1976) implicitly concludes in his writing that the foundations of feminist theory are built on categories of the dominant discourse on sexuality, and as such advocates an ethics that is not sexually biased.  Bailey (1993) does not necessarily see this as a problem for feminists, as she argues that their consistent reference to a male system of power necessarily involves reference to an opposition of female powerlessness. 

In contrast, an ethics of discourse that is not sexually biased, or based on an essentialist notion of the female, can liberate feminist theory from the trap of oppositional theories. This would enable feminists to utilise the construction of gender to achieve gains for women based on the recognition of the way in which they are disadvantaged through the social construction of sexuality.  Bailey argues: "feminist theories which seek to subvert or undermine masculinist power through recourse to a primary or essential sexuality will need to re-examine more closely what interests they are serving" (1993: 111).

Plaza (1980) scrutinises Foucault's desexualisation theory, when it is applied to the issue of rape.  If we are to remove sexuality and the site of the body as providing the knowlede of oneself, then to follow Foucault's logic, rape would no longer be regarded as a sexual crime but rather a crime against humanity.  However, as Plaza puts it: "If men rape women it is precisely because they are, in social terms, women, or else because they are 'the' sex, that is, bodies which they have appropriated...Rape is essentially sexual because it rests on the social difference of the sexes" (Plaza, 1980: 97).  Plaza identifies a contradiction in Foucault's argument that may render his position impotent.  On the one hand he advocates a move away from sexually embodied subjection, but on the other his theories suggest that rape be seen as a crime against humanity, and not specifically against the female embodied subject. It becomes clear then that Foucault lacks understanding of how women's social status is subjugated by the discourse on sexuality by the legal system alongside the discourse of the feminine.

Braidotti (1991) sees this contradiction as raising serious questions about the validity of Foucault's arguments and conceptualisation of the body: "a body fully immersed in the field of effects of power, miraculously escaped from the most widespread effect of the subjectification of the individual: sexual difference.  As if the Foucauldian body were immunized against this" (1991: 95).  One can argue that Foucault's language is 'phallocentric', his theories are not gender-neutral, as they in no way recognise the effects of bio-power on women in their everyday lives.

In other words, the phallocentrism of Foucault's language, and that of all masculinist theories, is based on one 'norm' if you like, one power, one knowledge/truth.  There is no recognition of that which is not 'one', thus Irigaray (1985) calls for an ethics of sexual difference, and a recognition of a feminine genealogy, in which women can reclaim their right to define themselves and their sex.  This would empower women to express the plurality of their subjectivity.  Sawicki (1986) also suggests that a feminist politics of difference would re-define differences between men and women, in which morality could be transformed to best serve different contexts; and expose some of our warped understandings of the world.

In conclusion, I maintain that despite the limits of traditional feminist theory implied by Foucault in his writing, he seems to offer no more than an alternative to traditional masculinist perspectives.  They have been exposed as negative and oppositional, another 'one' argument, amongst others, such as anti-capitalism, or civil rights politics.  Therefore, it is Irigaray who illuminates a tangible and ubiquitous challenge to the dominance of masculinist discourse.  An empowering, positive and relevant model for effecting change in the physical world, not least through discourse.

References:

Bell, V., Interrogating Incest.  Feminism, Foucault and the Law, (Routledge, London: 1993)

Braidotti, R., Patterns of Dissonance, (Polity Press, Oxford : 1991)

Foucault, M., The History of Sexuality: Vol 1, (Penguin, London: 1976)

Plaza, M., Our Costs and Their Benefits, (A Feminist Journal, No. 4: 1980)

Ramazanoglu, C., Up Against Foucault. Explorations of some tensions between Foucault and Feminism, (Routledge, London: 1993)

Apple Pie

Apple Pie

The time has come to set you free.

Although you always were.

The time has come to set me free,

The clouds are moving near.

I see them loom across the sky,

I wish they were closeby.

I'd scoop them up in big full swoops

And serve them with apple pie.

The Whole Spectrum

Rolling Tides

Offer me

Years of

Gritty

But

Interesting and

Vibrant moments

Let go.

Let go

If I could love

I could rise above

The childish tantrums

The doldrums

That leave me dry

And wondering why

It all went wrong.

If I could trust

I could let my lust

Just ebb and flow.

I could let go

of my defences,

my self made fences

And enjoy myself at last.

S.Camplin

Oh, If I could be a Cat...

Oh, If I could be a Cat...

Oh, If I could be a Cat...

I'd laze around all day.

I'd be calm and peaceful,

And I'd watch the world go by.

Perhaps I'd catch a bird, or rat,

And eat it 'til I got really fat!

I'd laugh at the people,

Worrying with all their woes,

And I'd lie back on my laurels,

And wiggle all my toes.

S.Camplin

The Smell of You

The Smell of You

The scent of a longed for loved one, lingers...

Between the sheets lie subtle layers

Of a cocktail, of sweat and sex,

Love and cologne.

A bittersweet memory of what has been.

Inducing intoxicating fantasies of further embrace.

Come again my love, and fill my bed

With thoughts of you.

Come again my love, and fill my head

With the smell of you.

S.Camplin

Blood is thicker than water and maybe space/time...?

I don't do the whole family thing particularly well. Don't get me wrong, I adore my Mum, she's my best mate. And I care deeply for my twin brothers and sister, and my Auntie Jane. Then there's my step-dad John and his Mother, Jean. My immediate family you might say. That is where the sense of obligation starts and ends for me though.

I live on my own and have done since before I went to Uni in 1994. Student house-sharing doesn't count. I do what I want, when I want, and that's how I like it.

I have been described as free-spirited (I know it's a bit cringe-worthy, but I quite like it), or fiercely independent (which I like better). Indeed, the following incident demonstrates this perfectly:

Last December I slipped on the ice and broke my shoulder. It is called a displaced proximal humerus fracture. Yep, the top of this bone snapped in two. Ouch is right! It bloody hurt and I struggled to get up from sitting down, getting out of bed and couldn't wash or brush my hair adequately without my Mum's help (aww my hero) for about 5 weeks. I felt frail & vulnerable. I reluctanctly agreed to stay at my Mum's for a few days. After 3 nights, I came back home.

I need, nay crave my own space. If I have spent too much time in the company of others I get the opposite of cabin fever. I'm not agoraphobic, I just like to feel completely centred for as much of the time as I possibly can. This requires me to feel as comfortable as possible with the people I spend my time with, without sounding like a complete stuck up biatch. 

So, the thought of spending time with extended family purely out of a sense of obligation, when I could be chilling on my own just ain't for me. My Mum has been back in touch with long-lost family members over last few years or so. And whilst it has been nice to see my cousins and catch up, I haven't really made an effort to stay in touch or build up relationships.

I like my little bubble of a life. It wouldn't be for everyone, but I just wanna be me.



My sister and I