Abusing Foucault

Since Foucault published 'The History of Sexuality - Vol 1' in 1976, his ideas on the genealogy of sexuality and the implicit critique of feminist theories in his writing have stimulated a vibrant and often divisive debate amongst feminists.  As Braidotti (1991) highlighted, his ideas converge with feminism in four main areas: (1) bio-power; (2) the emphasis on the specific and local mode of operation of power; (3) the crucial role of discourse in the production of both knowledge and power and (4) the critique of humanism.

I wish to concentrate on the two main areas of convergence: bio-power, which is power over the body or embodied subject; and the role of discourse in producing and maintaining knowledge and power.  I will then briefly relate these to a feminist understanding of rape, used as an example of male domination in practice.

Bio-power, Bailey (1993) has argued, is particularly significant in the everyday lives of women: "Women's very bodies are tailored, by women, to conform to social ideas which are historically specific...an expression of power-knowledge relations" (1993: 104). Indeed, Foucault identifies the way discourses about sex signify who we are, and sees discourses on sexuality, as one of the most powerful means of controlling the embodied subject.  He writes: "It is a type of power which is constantly exercised by means of surveillance rather than in a discontinuous manner by means of a system of levies" (Foucault, in Ramazanoglou, 1993: 110).  That is, it is so ingrained and pervasive that we are all complicit in instituting and realising sexual discourses.  They have become the norm.

In terms of how Foucault's ideas challenge feminist theories, Braidotti explains how he: "...shows the illusory nature of theories of 'liberation' insofar as they seem to imply the existence of an authentic or real sexuality that would somehow be uncontaminated or 'outside' the ruling codes of our culture" (1991: 89).  Foucault guards against 'totalising discourses' and by implication criticises theories such as those of feminists which regard patriarchy as a monolithic power structure, as this is seen as being too limited in scope.  Bell (1993) argues that feminist perspectives are largely reactive to masculinist ones, and as such an eternal, circular argument ensues.

One can also argue that feminists have yet to develop a 'feminist theory of power', one that would put forward a definition of power.  Instead feminists have concentrated their efforts on exposing unequal power relations and on suggesting alternative strategies for emancipation.  As Ramazanoglu and Holland (1993) point out: "feminism has given relatively little attention to women's efforts to support and enable men's power over them" (1993: 247).

However, Foucault's model of power did not demonstrate much interest in how this discursive-knowledge production affected the female embodied subject.  Foucault advocates a negotiation of our lives, bodies and pleasures 'within' power, and without the category 'sex'.  By this he means that a process of desexualisation needs to be engaged with in the course of our interactions, so as to subvert the dominant discourses.  This, it can be argued, seems at best rather vague and abstract in the context of women's struggles, and at worst does not allow for how sex-specific abuse may affect those who experience it. 

Furthermore, Bailey (1993) adds, our understanding of bodies is totally dependent on our 'knowledge' of them, she asks whether we can ever have access to bodies outside of this discourse.  She writes: "whether or not these bodily elements pre-exist...there is no way to talk about it, think about it, write about it, know it - because there is no recourse to language 'outside' of this" (1993: 108).  However, one can argue that Bailey's rather Foucauldian viewpoint is dependent on traditional, masculinist ways of conceptualising women's experience.  Indeed, Irigaray (1985) encourages women to return to their own bodies and its desires, as this is not a biological construct, but rather comprises feelings that characterise its own subjectivity.

Braidotti (1991) illuminates Foucault's tactic, in that he wants to isolate ways in which the embodied subject oppresses themselves in their interactions with others, he is effectively advocating a transformation of the 'self'.  Foucault (1976) implicitly concludes in his writing that the foundations of feminist theory are built on categories of the dominant discourse on sexuality, and as such advocates an ethics that is not sexually biased.  Bailey (1993) does not necessarily see this as a problem for feminists, as she argues that their consistent reference to a male system of power necessarily involves reference to an opposition of female powerlessness. 

In contrast, an ethics of discourse that is not sexually biased, or based on an essentialist notion of the female, can liberate feminist theory from the trap of oppositional theories. This would enable feminists to utilise the construction of gender to achieve gains for women based on the recognition of the way in which they are disadvantaged through the social construction of sexuality.  Bailey argues: "feminist theories which seek to subvert or undermine masculinist power through recourse to a primary or essential sexuality will need to re-examine more closely what interests they are serving" (1993: 111).

Plaza (1980) scrutinises Foucault's desexualisation theory, when it is applied to the issue of rape.  If we are to remove sexuality and the site of the body as providing the knowlede of oneself, then to follow Foucault's logic, rape would no longer be regarded as a sexual crime but rather a crime against humanity.  However, as Plaza puts it: "If men rape women it is precisely because they are, in social terms, women, or else because they are 'the' sex, that is, bodies which they have appropriated...Rape is essentially sexual because it rests on the social difference of the sexes" (Plaza, 1980: 97).  Plaza identifies a contradiction in Foucault's argument that may render his position impotent.  On the one hand he advocates a move away from sexually embodied subjection, but on the other his theories suggest that rape be seen as a crime against humanity, and not specifically against the female embodied subject. It becomes clear then that Foucault lacks understanding of how women's social status is subjugated by the discourse on sexuality by the legal system alongside the discourse of the feminine.

Braidotti (1991) sees this contradiction as raising serious questions about the validity of Foucault's arguments and conceptualisation of the body: "a body fully immersed in the field of effects of power, miraculously escaped from the most widespread effect of the subjectification of the individual: sexual difference.  As if the Foucauldian body were immunized against this" (1991: 95).  One can argue that Foucault's language is 'phallocentric', his theories are not gender-neutral, as they in no way recognise the effects of bio-power on women in their everyday lives.

In other words, the phallocentrism of Foucault's language, and that of all masculinist theories, is based on one 'norm' if you like, one power, one knowledge/truth.  There is no recognition of that which is not 'one', thus Irigaray (1985) calls for an ethics of sexual difference, and a recognition of a feminine genealogy, in which women can reclaim their right to define themselves and their sex.  This would empower women to express the plurality of their subjectivity.  Sawicki (1986) also suggests that a feminist politics of difference would re-define differences between men and women, in which morality could be transformed to best serve different contexts; and expose some of our warped understandings of the world.

In conclusion, I maintain that despite the limits of traditional feminist theory implied by Foucault in his writing, he seems to offer no more than an alternative to traditional masculinist perspectives.  They have been exposed as negative and oppositional, another 'one' argument, amongst others, such as anti-capitalism, or civil rights politics.  Therefore, it is Irigaray who illuminates a tangible and ubiquitous challenge to the dominance of masculinist discourse.  An empowering, positive and relevant model for effecting change in the physical world, not least through discourse.

References:

Bell, V., Interrogating Incest.  Feminism, Foucault and the Law, (Routledge, London: 1993)

Braidotti, R., Patterns of Dissonance, (Polity Press, Oxford : 1991)

Foucault, M., The History of Sexuality: Vol 1, (Penguin, London: 1976)

Plaza, M., Our Costs and Their Benefits, (A Feminist Journal, No. 4: 1980)

Ramazanoglu, C., Up Against Foucault. Explorations of some tensions between Foucault and Feminism, (Routledge, London: 1993)